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Abstract Previous research has indicated that implicit
motives can reliably predict which behaviors people select
or decide to perform. However, so far, the question of how
these motives are able to predict this action selection
process has received little attention. Based on ideomotor
theory, we argue that implicit motives can predict action
selection when an action has become associated with a
motive-congruent (dis)incentive through repeated experi-
ences with the action-outcome relationship. This idea was
investigated by examining whether the implicit need for
power (nPower) would come to predict action selection
(i.e., choosing to press either of two buttons) when these
actions had repeatedly resulted in motive-congruent
(dis)incentives (i.e., submissive or dominant faces). Both
Studies 1 and 2 indicated that participants became more
likely to select the action predictive of the motive-con-
gruent outcome as their history with the action-outcome
relationship increased. Study 2 indicated that this effect
stemmed from both an approach towards incentives and an
avoidance of disincentives. These results indicate that
implicit motives (particularly the power motive) can pre-
dict action selection as a result of learning which actions
yield motive-congruent (dis)incentives. Our findings
therefore offer a model of how implicit motives can come
to predict which behaviors people select to perform.
Introduction
A major part of everyday human behavior consists of
making decisions. When making these decisions, people
often rely on what motivates them most. Accordingly,
human behavior generally originates from an action
selection process that takes into account whether the effects
resulting from actions match with people’s motives (Bin-
dra, 1974; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Locke & Latham, 2002;
McClelland, 1985). Although people can explicitly report
on what motivates them, these explicit reports tell only half
the story, as there also exist implicit motives of which
people are themselves unaware (McClelland, Koestner, &
Weinberger, 1989). These implicit motives have been
defined as people’s non-conscious motivational disposi-
tions that orient, select and energize spontaneous behavior
(McClelland, 1987). Generally, three different motives are
distinguished: the need for affiliation, achievement or
power. These motives have been found to predict many
different types of behavior, such as social interaction fre-
quency (Wegner, Bohnacker, Mempel, Teubel, & Schu¨ler,
2014), task performance (Brunstein & Maier, 2005), and
emotion detection (Donhauser, Ro¨sch, & Schultheiss,
2015). Despite the fact that many studies have indicated
that implicit motives can direct and control people in
performing a variety of behaviors, little is known about the
mechanisms through which implicit motives come to pre-
dict the behaviors people choose to perform. The aim of the
current article is to provide a first attempt at elucidating
this relationship between implicit motives (particularly the
power motive) and the selection of specific behaviors.
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An important tenet underlying most decision-making
models and expectancy value approaches to action selec-
tion and behavior is that people are generally motivated to
increase positive and limit negative experiences (Kahne-
man, Wakker, & Sarin, 1997; Oishi & Diener, 2003;
Schwartz, Ward, Monterosso, Lyubomirsky, White, &
Lehman, 2002; Thaler, 1980; Thorndike, 1898; Veen-
hoven, 2004). Hence, when someone has to select an action
from several potential candidates, this person is likely to
weigh each action’s respective outcomes based on their to
be experienced utility. This ultimately results in the action
being selected which is perceived to be most likely to yield
the most positive (or least negative) result. For this process
to function properly, people would need to be able to
predict the consequences of their potential actions.
This process of action-outcome prediction in the context
of action selection is central to the theoretical approach of
ideomotor learning. According to ideomotor theory
(Greenwald, 1970; Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010), actions
are stored in memory in conjunction with their respective
outcomes. That is, if a person has learned through repeated
experiences that a specific action (e.g., pressing a button)
produces a specific outcome (e.g., a loud noise) then the
predictive relation between this action and respective out-
come will be stored in memory as a common code
(Hommel, Mu¨sseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). This
common code thereby represents the integration of the
properties of both the action and the respective outcome
into a singular stored representation. Because of this
common code, activating the representation of the action
automatically activates the representation of this action’s
learned outcome. Similarly, the activation of the repre-
sentation of the outcome automatically activates the rep-
resentation of the action that has been learned to precede it
(Elsner & Hommel, 2001). This automatic bidirectional
activation of action and outcome representations makes it
possible for people to predict their potential actions’ out-
comes after learning the action-outcome relationship, as
the action representation inherent to the action selection
process will prime a consideration of the previously
learned action outcome.
When people have established a history with the action-
outcome relationship, thereby learning that a specific
action predicts a specific outcome, action selection can be
biased in accordance with the divergence in desirability of
the potential actions’ predicted outcomes. From the per-
spective of evaluative conditioning (De Houwer, Thomas,
& Baeyens, 2001) and incentive or instrumental learning
(Berridge, 2001; Dickinson & Balleine, 1994, 1995;
Thorndike, 1898), the extent to which an outcome is
desirable is determined by the affective experiences asso-
ciated with the obtainment of the outcome. Hereby, rela-
tively pleasurable experiences associated with specific
outcomes allow these outcomes to serve as incentives for
subsequent actions that are perceived as instrumental in
obtaining these outcomes (Dickinson & Balleine, 1995).
Recent research on the consolidation of ideomotor and
incentive learning has indicated that affect can function as
a feature of an action-outcome relationship. First, repeated
experiences with relationships between actions and affec-
tive (positive vs. negative) action outcomes cause indi-
viduals to automatically select actions that produce positive
and negative action outcomes (Beckers, de Houwer, &
Eelen, 2002; Lavender & Hommel, 2007; Eder, Mu¨sseler,
& Hommel, 2012). Furthermore, such action-outcome
learning eventually can become functional in biasing the
individual’s motivational action orientation, such that
actions are selected in the service of approaching positive
outcomes and avoiding negative outcomes (Eder & Hom-
mel, 2013; Eder, Rothermund, De Houwer & Hommel,
2015; Marien, Aarts & Custers, 2015).
This line of research suggests that people are able to
predict their actions’ affective outcomes and bias their
action selection accordingly through repeated experiences
with the action-outcome relationship. Extending this
combination of ideomotor and incentive learning to the
domain of individual differences in implicit motivational
dispositions and action selection, it can be hypothesized
that implicit motives could predict and modulate action
selection when two criteria are met. First, implicit motives
would need to predict affective responses to stimuli that
serve as outcomes of actions. Second, the action-outcome
relationship between a specific action and this motive-
congruent (dis)incentive would need to be learned through
repeated experience.
According to motivational field theory, facial expres-
sions can induce motive-congruent affect and thereby serve
as motive-related incentives (Schultheiss, 2007; Stanton,
Hall, & Schultheiss, 2010). As people with a high implicit
need for power (nPower) hold a desire to influence, control
and impress others (Fodor, 2010), they respond relatively
positively to faces signaling submissiveness. This notion is
corroborated by research showing that nPower predicts
greater activation of the reward circuitry after viewing
faces signaling submissiveness (Schultheiss & Schiepe-
Tiska, 2013), as well as increased attention towards faces
signaling submissiveness (Schultheiss & Hale, 2007;
Schultheiss, Wirth, Waugh, Stanton, Meier, & Reuter-
Lorenz, 2008). Indeed, previous research has indicated that
the relationship between nPower and motivated actions
towards faces signaling submissiveness can be susceptible
to learning effects (Schultheiss & Rohde, 2002; Schul-
theiss, Wirth, Torges, Pang, Villacorta, & Welsh, 2005a).
For example, nPower predicted response speed and accu-
racy after actions had been learned to predict faces sig-
naling submissiveness in an acquisition phase (Schultheiss,
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Pang, Torges, Wirth, & Treynor, 2005b). Empirical sup-
port, then, has been obtained for both the idea that (1)
implicit motives relate to stimuli-induced affective
responses and (2) that implicit motives’ predictive capa-
bilities can be modulated by repeated experiences with the
action-outcome relationship. Consequently, for people high
in nPower, an action predicting submissive faces would be
expected to become increasingly more positive and hence
increasingly more likely to be selected as people learn the
action-outcome relationship, while the opposite would be
true for actions predicting dominant faces as action
outcomes.
The present research
To test the proposed role of implicit motives (here
specifically the need for power) in predicting action
selection after action-outcome learning, we developed a
novel task in which an individual repeatedly (and freely)
decides to press one of two buttons. Each button leads to a
different outcome, namely the presentation of a submissive
or dominant face, respectively. This procedure is repeated
80 times to allow participants to learn the action-outcome
relationship. As the actions will not initially be represented
in terms of their outcomes, due to a lack of established
history, nPower is not expected to immediately predict
action selection. However, as participants’ history with the
action-outcome relationship increases over trials, we
expect nPower to become a stronger predictor of action
selection in favor of the predicted motive-congruent
incentivizing outcome. We report two studies to examine
these expectations.
Study 1 aimed to offer an initial test of our ideas.
Specifically, employing a within-subject design, partici-
pants repeatedly decided to press one of two buttons that
were followed by a submissive or dominant face, respec-
tively. This procedure thus allowed us to examine the
extent to which nPower predicts action selection in favor of
the predicted motive-congruent incentive as a function of
the participant’s history with the action-outcome relation-
ship. In addition, for exploratory purpose, Study 1 included
a power manipulation for half of the participants. The
manipulation involved a recall procedure of past power
experiences that has frequently been used to elicit implicit
motive-congruent behavior (e.g., Slabbinck, de Houwer, &
van Kenhove, 2013; Woike, Bender, & Besner, 2009).
Accordingly, we could explore whether the hypothesized
interaction between nPower and history with the action-
outcome relationship predicting action selection in favor of
the predicted motive-congruent incentivizing outcome is
conditional on the presence of power recall experiences.
Study 1
Method
Participants and design
Study 1 employed a stopping rule of at least 40 participants
per condition, with additional participants being included if
they could be found within the allotted time period. This
resulted in eighty-seven students (40 female) with an
average age of 22.32 years (SD = 4.21) participating in
the study in exchange for a monetary compensation or
partial course credit. Participants were randomly assigned
to either the power (n = 43) or control (n = 44) condition.
Materials and procedure
The study started with the Picture Story Exercise (PSE);
the most commonly used task for measuring implicit
motives (Schultheiss, Yankova, Dirlikov, & Schad, 2009).
The PSE is a reliable, valid and stable measure of implicit
motives which is susceptible to experimental manipulation
and has been used to predict a multitude of different
motive-congruent behaviors (Latham & Piccolo, 2012;
Pang, 2010; Ramsay & Pang, 2013; Pennebaker & King,
1999; Schultheiss & Pang, 2007; Schultheiss & Schul-
theiss, 2014). Importantly, the PSE shows no correlation
with explicit measures (Ko¨llner & Schultheiss, 2014;
Schultheiss & Brunstein, 2001; Spangler, 1992). During
this task, participants were shown six pictures of ambigu-
ous social scenarios depicting, respectively, a ship captain
and passenger; two trapeze artists; two boxers; two women
in a laboratory; a couple by a river; a couple in a nightclub.
These pictures have frequently been used to assess implicit
motives and are the most strongly recommended pictorial
stimuli (Pang & Schultheiss, 2005; Schultheiss & Pang,
2007). Pictures were presented in a random order for 10 s
each. After each picture, participants had 2–4 min to write
an imaginative story related to the picture’s content.
In accordance with Winter’s (1994) Manual for scoring
motive imagery in running text, power motive imagery
(nPower) was scored whenever the participant’s stories
mentioned any strong and/or forceful actions with an
inherent impact on other people or the world at large;
attempts to control or regulate others; attempts to influence,
persuade, convince, make or prove a point; provision of
unsolicited help, advice or support; attempts to impress
others or the world at large; (concern about) fame, prestige
or reputation; or any strong emotional reactions in one
person or group of people to the intentional actions of
another. The condition-blind rater had previously obtained
a confidence agreement exceeding 0.85 with expert scoring
562 Psychological Research (2017) 81:560–570
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(Winter, 1994). A second condition-blind rater with similar
expertise independently scored a random quarter of the
stories (inter-rater reliability: r = 0.95). The absolute
number of power motive images as assessed by the first
rater (M = 4.62; SD = 3.06) correlated significantly with
story length in words (M = 543.56; SD = 166.24),
r(85) = 0.61, p\ 0.01. In accordance with recommenda-
tions (Schultheiss & Pang, 2007), a regression for word
count was therefore conducted, whereby nPower scores
were converted to standardized residuals.
After the PSE, participants in the power condition were
given 2–4 min to write down a story about an event where
they had dominated the situation and had exercised control
over others. This recall procedure is often used to elicit
implicit motive-congruent behavior (e.g., Slabbinck et al.,
2013; Woike et al., 2009). The recall procedure was
omitted in the control condition.
Subsequently, participants partook in the newly devel-
oped Decision-Outcome Task (see Fig. 1). This task con-
sisted of six practice and 80 critical trials. Each trial
allowed participants an unlimited amount of time to freely
decide between two actions, namely to press either a left or
right key (i.e., the A or L button on the keyboard). Each
key press was followed by the presentation of a picture of a
Caucasian male face with a direct gaze, of which partici-
pants were instructed to meet the gaze. Faces were taken
from the Dominance Face Data Set (Oosterhof & Todorov,
2008), which consists of computer-generated faces
manipulated in perceived dominance with FaceGen 3.1
software. Two versions (one version two standard devia-
tions below and one version two standard deviations above
the mean dominance level) of six different faces were
selected. These versions constituted the submissive and
dominant faces, respectively. The decision to press left or
right always led to either a randomly without replacement
selected submissive or a randomly without replacement
selected dominant face respectively. Which key press led
to which face type was counter-balanced between
participants.
Faces were shown for 2000 ms, after which an 800 ms
black and circular fixation point was shown at the same
screen location as had previously been occupied by the
region between the faces’ eyes. This was followed by a
randomly colored square or circle, shown for 1500 ms at
the same location. Color randomization covered the whole
color spectrum, except for values too difficult to distinguish
from the white background (i.e., too close to white).
Squares and circles were presented equally in a randomized
order, with participants having to press the G button on the
keyboard for squares and refrain from responding for cir-
cles. This fixation element of the task served to incentivize
properly meeting the faces’ gaze, as the response-relevant
stimuli were presented on spatially congruent locations. In
the practice trials, participants’ responses or lack thereof
were followed by accuracy feedback. After the square or
circle (and subsequent accuracy feedback) had disap-
peared, a 500-millisecond pause was employed, followed
by the next trial starting anew. Having completed the
Decision-Outcome Task, participants were presented with
several 7-point Likert scale control questions and demo-
graphic questions (see Tables 1 and 2 respectively in the
supplementary online material).
Preparatory data analysis
Based on a priori established exclusion criteria, eight par-
ticipants’ data were excluded from the analysis. For two
participants, this was due to a combined score of three or
Fig. 1 Procedure of one trial in
the Decision-Outcome Task
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lower on the control questions ‘‘How motivated were you
to perform as well as possible during the decision task?’’
and ‘‘How important did you think it was to perform as
well as possible during the decision task?’’, on Likert scales
ranging from 1 (not motivated/important at all) to 7 (very
motivated/important). The data of four participants were
excluded because they pressed the same button on more
than 95 % of the trials, and two other participants’ data
were excluded because they pressed the same button on
90 % of the first 40 trials. Other a priori exclusion criteria
did not result in data exclusion.
Results
Power motive
We hypothesized that the implicit need for power (nPower)
would predict the decision to press the button leading to the
motive-congruent incentive of a submissive face after this
action-outcome relationship had been experienced repeat-
edly. In accordance with commonly used practices in
repetitive decision-making designs (e.g., Bowman, Evans,
& Turnbull, 2005; de Vries, Holland, & Witteman, 2008),
decisions were examined in four blocks of 20 trials. These
four blocks served as a within-subjects variable in a general
linear model with recall manipulation (i.e., power versus
control condition) as a between-subjects factor and nPower
as a between-subjects continuous predictor. We report the
multivariate results as the assumption of sphericity was
violated, v = 15.49, e = 0.88, p = 0.01. First, there was a
main effect of nPower,1 F(1, 76) = 12.01, p\ 0.01,
g2p = 0.14. Furthermore, in line with expectations, the
analysis yielded a significant interaction effect of nPower
with the four blocks of trials,2 F(3, 73) = 7.00, p\ 0.01,
g2p = 0.22. Finally, the analyses yielded a three-way
interaction between blocks, nPower and recall manipula-
tion that did not reach the conventional level of
significance,3 F(3, 73) = 2.66, p = 0.055, g2p = 0.10.
Figure 2 presents the percentage of action choices leading
to submissive (vs. dominant) faces as a function of block
and nPower collapsed across recall manipulations (see
Figures S1 and S2 in supplementary online material for
figures per recall manipulation).
Conducting the aforementioned analysis separately for
the two recall manipulations revealed that the interaction
effect between nPower and blocks was significant in both
the power, F(3, 34) = 4.47, p = 0.01, g2p = 0.28, and
control condition, F(3, 37) = 4.79, p = 0.01, g2p = 0.28.
Interestingly, this interaction effect followed a linear trend
for blocks in the power condition, F(1, 36) = 13.65,
p\ 0.01, g2p = 0.28, but not in the control condition, F(1,
39) = 2.13, p = 0.15, g2p = 0.05. The main effect of
nPower was significant in both conditions, ps B 0.02.
Taken together, then, the data suggest that the power
manipulation was not required for observing an effect of
nPower, with the only between-manipulations difference
constituting the effect’s linearity.
Additional analyses
We conducted several additional analyses to assess the
extent to which the aforementioned predictive relations
could be considered implicit and motive-specific. Based on
a 7-point Likert scale control question that asked partici-
pants about the extent to which they preferred the pictures
following either the left versus right key press (recoded
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Fig. 2 Estimated marginal means of choices leading to submissive
(vs. dominant) faces as a function of block and nPower collapsed
across recall manipulations. Error bars represent standard errors of
the mean
1 Conducting the same analyses without any data removal did not
change the significance of these results. There was a significant main
effect of nPower, F(1, 81) = 11.75, p\ 0.01, g2p = 0.13, a signif-
icant interaction between nPower and blocks, F(3, 79) = 4.79,
p\ 0.01, g2p = 0.15, and no significant three-way interaction
between nPower, blocks andrecall manipulation, F(3, 79) = 1.44,
p = 0.24, g2p = 0.05.
2 As an alternative analysis, we calculated changes in action selection
by multiplying the percentage of actions selected towards submissive
faces per block with their respective linear contrast weights (i.e., -3,
-1, 1, 3). This measurement correlated significantly with nPower,
R = 0.38, 95 % CI [0.17, 0.55]. Correlations between nPower and
actions selected per block were R = 0.10 [-0.12, 0.32], R = 0.32
[0.11, 0.50], R = 0.29 [0.08, 0.48], and R = 0.41 [0.20, 0.57],
respectively.
3 This effect was significant if, instead of a multivariate approach, we
had elected to apply a Huynh–Feldt correction to the univariate
approach, F(2.64, 225) = 3.57, p = 0.02, g2p = 0.05.
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depending on counterbalance condition), a linear regres-
sion analysis indicated that nPower did not predict people’s
reported preferences, t = 1.05, p = 0.297. Adding this
measure of explicit picture preference to the aforemen-
tioned analyses did not change the significance of nPower’s
main or interaction effect with blocks (ps\ 0.01), nor did
this factor interact with blocks and/or nPower, Fs\ 1,
suggesting that nPower’s effects occurred irrespective of
explicit preferences.4 Furthermore, replacing nPower as
predictor with either nAchievement or nAffiliation
revealed no significant interactions of said predictors with
blocks, Fs(3, 75) B 1.92, ps C 0.13, indicating that this
predictive relation was specific to the incentivized motive.
A prior investigation into the predictive relation between
nPower and learning effects (Schultheiss et al., 2005b)
observed significant effects only when participants’ sex
matched that of the facial stimuli. We therefore explored
whether this sex-congruency effect was also present here.
As we used only male faces, the sex-congruency effect
would entail a three-way interaction between nPower,
blocks and sex with the effect being strongest for males.
This three-way interaction did not, however, reach signif-
icance, F\ 1, indicating that the aforementioned effects,
ps\ 0.01, did not depend on sex-congruency. Still, some
effects of sex were observed, but none of these related to
the learning effect, as indicated by a lack of significant
interactions including blocks and sex. Hence, these results
are only discussed in the supplementary online material.
Discussion
Despite many studies indicating that implicit motives can
predict which actions people choose to perform, less is
known about how this action selection process arises. We
argue that establishing an action-outcome relationship
between a specific action and an outcome with motive-
congruent (dis)incentive value can allow implicit motives
to predict action selection (Dickinson & Balleine, 1994;
Eder & Hommel, 2013; Schultheiss et al., 2005b). The first
study supported this idea, as the implicit need for power
(nPower) was found to become a stronger predictor of
action selection as the history with the action-outcome
relationship increased. This effect was observed irrespec-
tive of whether participants’ nPower was first aroused by
means of a recall procedure.
It is important to note that in Study 1, submissive faces
were used as motive-congruent incentives, while dominant
faces were used as motive-congruent disincentives. As both
of these (dis)incentives could have biased action selection,
either together or separately, it is as of yet unclear to which
extent nPower predicts action selection based on experi-
ences with actions resulting in incentivizing or disincen-
tivizing outcomes. Ruling out this issue allows for a more
precise understanding of how nPower predicts action
selection towards and/or away from the predicted motive-
related outcomes after a history of action-outcome learn-
ing. Accordingly, Study 2 was conducted to further
investigate this question by manipulating between partici-
pants whether actions led to submissive versus dominant,
neutral versus dominant, or neutral versus submissive
faces. The submissive versus dominant condition is similar
to Study 10s control condition, thus offering a direct
replication of Study 1. However, from the perspective of
the need for power, the second and third conditions can be
conceptualized as avoidance and approach conditions,
respectively.
Study 2
Method
Participants and design
Following Study 1’s stopping rule, one hundred and
twenty-one students (82 female) with an average age of
21.41 years (SD = 3.05) participated in the study in
exchange for a monetary compensation or partial course
credit. Participants were randomly assigned to either the
approach (n = 41), avoidance (n = 41) or control
(n = 40) condition.
Materials and procedure
Study 2 was used to investigate whether Study 1’s results
could be attributed to an approach towards the submissive
faces due to their incentive value and/or an avoidance of
the dominant faces due to their disincentive value. This
study therefore largely mimicked Study 1’s protocol,5 with
only three divergences. First, the power manipulation was
4 A more detailed measure of explicit preferences had been
conducted in a pilot study (n = 30). Participants were asked to rate
each of the faces employed in the Decision-Outcome Task on how
positively they experienced and attractive they considered each face
on separate 7-point Likert scales. The interaction between face type
(dominant vs. submissive) and nPower did not significantly predict
evaluations, F\ 1. nPower did show a significant main effect,
F(1,27) = 6.74, p = 0.02, g2p = 0.20, indicating that people high in
nPower generally rated other people’s faces more negatively. These
data further support the idea that nPower does not relate to explicit
preferences for submissive over dominant faces.
5 The number of power motive images (M = 4.04; SD = 2.62) again
correlated significantly with story length in words (M = 561.49;
SD = 172.49), r(121) = 0.56, p\ 0.01, We therefore again converted
the nPower score to standardized residuals after a regression for word
count.
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omitted from all conditions. This was done as Study 1
indicated that the manipulation was not required for
observing an effect. Furthermore, this manipulation has
been found to increase approach behavior and hence may
have confounded our investigation into whether Study 1’s
results constituted approach and/or avoidance behavior
(Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Smith & Bargh,
2008).
Second, the approach and avoidance conditions were
added, which used different faces as outcomes during the
Decision-Outcome Task. The faces used by the approach
condition were either submissive (i.e., two standard devi-
ations below the mean dominance level) or neutral (i.e.,
mean dominance level). Conversely, the avoidance condi-
tion used either dominant (i.e., two standard deviations
above the mean dominance level) or neutral faces. The
control condition used the same submissive and dominant
faces as had been used in Study 1. Hence, in the approach
condition, participants could decide to approach an incen-
tive (viz., submissive face), whereas they could decide to
avoid a disincentive (viz., dominant face) in the avoidance
condition and do both in the control condition.
Third, after completing the Decision-Outcome Task,
participants in all conditions proceeded to the BIS-BAS
questionnaire, which measures explicit approach and
avoidance tendencies and had been added for explorative
purposes (Carver & White, 1994). It is possible that
dominant faces’ disincentive value only leads to avoidance
behavior (i.e., more actions towards other faces) for people
relatively high in explicit avoidance tendencies, while the
submissive faces’ incentive value only leads to approach
behavior (i.e., more actions towards submissive faces) for
people relatively high in explicit approach tendencies. This
exploratory questionnaire served to investigate this possi-
bility. The questionnaire consisted of 20 statements, which
participants responded to on a 4-point Likert scale ranging
from 1 (not true for me at all) to 4 (completely true for me).
The Behavioral Inhibition Scale (BIS) comprised seven
questions (e.g., ‘‘I worry about making mistakes’’;
a = 0.75). The Behavioral Activation Scale (BAS) com-
prised thirteen questions (a = 0.79) and consisted of three
subscales, namely the Reward Responsiveness (BASR;
a = 0.66; e.g., ‘‘It would excite me to win a contest’’),
Drive (BASD; a = 0.77; e.g., ‘‘I go out of my way to get
things I want’’) and Fun Seeking subscales (BASF;
a = 0.64; e.g., ‘‘I crave excitement and new sensations’’).
Preparatory data analysis
Based on a priori established exclusion criteria, five par-
ticipants’ data were excluded from the analysis. Four par-
ticipants’ data were excluded because they pressed the
same key on more than 95 % of the trials. One other
participant’s data were excluded due to a consistent
response pattern (i.e., minimal descriptive complexity of
‘‘40 times AL’’).
Results
Power motive
Study 2 sought to investigate whether nPower could predict
the selection of actions based on outcomes that were either
motive-congruent incentives (approach condition) or dis-
incentives (avoidance condition) or both (control condi-
tion). To compare the different stimuli manipulations, we
coded responses in accordance with whether they related to
the most dominant (i.e., dominant faces in avoidance and
control condition, neutral faces in approach condition) or
most submissive (i.e., submissive faces in approach and
control condition, neutral faces in avoidance condition)
available option. We report the multivariate results because
the assumption of sphericity was violated, v = 23.59,
e = 0.87, p\ 0.01. The analysis showed that nPower
significantly interacted with blocks to predict decisions
leading to the most submissive (or least dominant) faces,6
F(3, 108) = 4.01, p = 0.01, g2p = 0.10. Furthermore, no
three-way interaction was observed including the stimuli
manipulation (i.e., avoidance vs. approach vs. control
condition) as factor, F(6, 216) = 0.19, p = 0.98,
g2p = 0.01. Lastly, the two-way interaction between nPo-
wer and stimuli manipulation approached significance, F(1,
110) = 2.97, p = 0.055, g2p = 0.05. As this between-
conditions difference was, however, neither significant,
related to nor challenging the hypotheses, it is not dis-
cussed further. Figure 3 displays the mean percentage of
action choices leading to the most submissive (vs. most
dominant) faces as a function of block and nPower col-
lapsed across the stimuli manipulations (see Figures S3, S4
and S5 in the supplementary online material for a display
of these results per condition).
6 Conducting the same analyses without any data removal did not
change the significance of the hypothesized results. There was a
significant interaction between nPower and blocks, F(3, 113) = 4.14,
p = 0.01, g2p = 0.10, and no significant three-way interaction
between nPower, blocks and stimuli manipulation, F(6,
226) = 0.23, p = 0.97, g2p = 0.01. Conducting the alternative anal-
ysis, whereby changes in action selection were calculated by
multiplying the percentage of actions selected towards submissive
faces per block with their respective linear contrast weights (i.e., -3,
-1, 1, 3), again revealed a significant correlation between this
measurement and nPower, R = 0.30, 95 % CI [0.13, 0.46]. Correla-
tions between nPower and actions selected per block were R = -0.01
[-0.20, 0.17], R = -0.04 [-0.22, 0.15], R = 0.21 [0.03, 0.38], and
R = 0.25 [0.07, 0.41], respectively.
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Behavioral inhibition and activation scales
Before conducting the explorative analyses on whether
explicit inhibition or activation tendencies affect the pre-
dictive relation between nPower and action selection, we
examined whether participants’ responses on any of the
behavioral inhibition or activation scales were affected by
the stimuli manipulation. Separate ANOVA’s indicated
that this was not the case, Fs B 1.23, ps C 0.30. Next, we
added the BIS, BAS or any of its subscales separately to the
aforementioned repeated-measures analyses. These analy-
ses did not reveal any significant predictive relations
involving nPower and said (sub)scales, ps C 0.10, except
for a significant four-way interaction between blocks,
stimuli manipulation, nPower and the Drive subscale
(BASD), F(6, 204) = 2.18, p = 0.046, g2p = 0.06. Split-
ting the analyses by stimuli manipulation did not yield any
significant interactions involving both nPower and BASD,
ps C 0.17. Hence, although the conditions observed dif-
fering three-way interactions between nPower, blocks and
BASD, this effect did not reach significance for any
specific condition. The interaction between participants’
nPower and established history regarding the action-out-
come relationship therefore appears to predict the selection
of actions both towards incentives and away from disin-
centives irrespective of participants’ explicit approach or
avoidance tendencies.
Additional analyses
In accordance with the analyses for Study 1, we again
employed a linear regression analysis to investigate whe-
ther nPower predicted people’s reported preferences for
pictures following the pressing of either button, which was
not the case, t\ 1. Adding this measure of explicit picture
preferences to the aforementioned analyses again did not
change the significance of nPower’s interaction effect with
blocks, p = 0.01, nor did this factor interact with blocks or
nPower, Fs\ 1, suggesting that nPower’s effects occurred
irrespective of explicit preferences. Furthermore, replac-
ing nPower as predictor with either nAchievement or
nAffiliation again revealed no significant interactions of
said predictors with blocks, Fs(3,112) B 1.42, ps C 0.12,
indicating that this predictive relation was specific to the
incentivized motive. Lastly, we again observed no sig-
nificant three-way interaction including nPower, blocks
and participants’ sex, F\ 1, nor were the effects includ-
ing sex as denoted in the supplementary material for Study
1 replicated, Fs\ 1.
General discussion
Building on a wealth of research showing that implicit
motives can predict many different types of behavior, the
present study set out to examine the potential mechanism
by which these motives predict which specific behaviors
people decide to engage in. We argued, based on theorizing
regarding ideomotor and incentive learning (Dickinson &
Balleine, 1995; Eder et al., 2015; Hommel et al., 2001),
that previous experiences with actions predicting motive-
congruent incentives are likely to render these actions more
positive themselves and hence make them more likely to be
selected. Accordingly, we investigated whether the implicit
need for power (nPower) would become a stronger pre-
dictor of deciding to execute one over another action (here,
pressing different buttons) as people established a greater
history with these actions and their subsequent motive-re-
lated (dis)incentivizing outcomes (i.e., submissive versus
dominant faces). Both Studies 1 and 2 supported this idea.
Study 1 demonstrated that this effect occurs without the
need to arouse nPower in advance, while Study 2 showed
that the interaction effect of nPower and established history
on action selection was due to both the submissive faces’
incentive value and the dominant faces’ disincentive value.
Taken together, then, nPower seems to predict action
selection as a result of incentive processing of faces that are
represented as action-outcomes.
The present demonstration that implicit motives predict
actions after they have become associated, by means of
action-outcome learning, with faces differing in dominance
level concurs with evidence collected to test central aspects
of motivational field theory (Stanton et al., 2010). This
theory argues, amongst others, that nPower predicts the
incentive value of faces diverging in signaled dominance
level. Studies that have supported this notion have shown
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that nPower is positively associated with the recruitment of
the brain’s reward circuitry (especially the dorsoanterior
striatum) after viewing relatively submissive faces
(Schultheiss & Schiepe-Tiska, 2013), and predicts implicit
learning as a result of, recognition speed of, and attention
towards faces diverging in signaled dominance level
(Donhauser et al., 2015; Schultheiss & Hale, 2007;
Schultheiss et al., 2005b, 2008). The current studies extend
the behavioral evidence for this idea by observing similar
learning effects for the predictive relationship between
nPower and action selection.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the present
studies followed the ideomotor principle to investigate the
potential building blocks of implicit motives’ predictive
effects on behavior. The ideomotor principle, according to
which actions are represented in terms of their perceptual
results, provides a sound account for understanding how
action-outcome knowledge is acquired and involved in
action selection (Hommel, 2013; Shin et al., 2010).
Interestingly, recent research provided evidence that
affective outcome information can be associated with
actions and that such learning can direct approach versus
avoidance responses to affective stimuli that were previ-
ously learned to follow from these actions (Eder et al.,
2015). Thus far, research on ideomotor learning has
mainly focused on demonstrating that action-outcome
learning pertains to the binding of actions and neutral or
affect laden events, while the question of how social
motivational dispositions, such as implicit motives,
interact with the learning of the affective properties of
action-outcome relationships has not been addressed
empirically. The present research specifically indicated
that ideomotor learning and action selection might be
influenced by nPower, thereby extending research on
ideomotor learning to the realm of social motivation and
behavior. Accordingly, the present findings offer a model
for understanding and examining how human decision-
making is modulated by implicit motives in general.
To further advance this ideomotor explanation regarding
implicit motives’ predictive capabilities, future research
could examine whether implicit motives can predict the
occurrence of a bidirectional activation of action-outcome
representations (Hommel et al., 2001). Specifically, it is as
of yet unclear whether the extent to which the perception of
the motive-congruent outcome facilitates the preparation of
the associated action is susceptible to implicit motivational
processes. Future research examining this possibility could
potentially provide further support for the current claim of
ideomotor learning underlying the interactive relationship
between nPower and a history with the action-outcome
relationship in predicting behavioral tendencies.
Beyond ideomotor theory, it is worth noting that
although we observed an increased predictive relationship
between nPower and action selection as the learning his-
tory increased, this does not necessarily mean that the
establishment of a learning history is required for nPower
to predict action selection. Outcome predictions can be
enabled through methods other than action-outcome
learning (e.g., telling people what will happen) and such
manipulations may, consequently, yield similar effects.
The hereby proposed mechanism may therefore not be the
only such mechanism allowing for nPower to predict action
selection.
It is also worth noting that the currently observed pre-
dictive relation between nPower and action selection is
inherently correlational. Although this makes conclusions
regarding causality problematic, it does indicate that the
Decision-Outcome Task (DOT) could be perceived as an
alternative measure of nPower. These studies, then, could
be interpreted as evidence for convergent validity between
the two measures. Somewhat problematically, however, the
power manipulation in Study 1 did not yield an increase in
action selection favoring submissive faces (as a function of
established history). Hence, these results could be inter-
preted as a failure to establish causal validity (Borsboom,
Mellenberg, & van Heerden, 2004). A potential reason for
this may be that the current manipulation was too weak to
significantly affect action selection. In their validation of
the PA-IAT as a measure of nPower, for example, Slab-
binck, de Houwer and van Kenhove (2011) set the mini-
mum arousal manipulation duration at 5 min, whereas
Woike et al., (2009) used a 10 min long manipulation.
Considering that the maximal length of our manipulation
was 4 min, participants may have been given insufficient
time for the manipulation to take effect. Subsequent studies
could examine whether increased action selection towards
submissive faces is observed when the manipulation is
employed for a longer period of time. Further studies into
the validity of the DOT task (e.g., predictive and causal
validity), then, could help the understanding of not just the
mechanisms underlying implicit motives, but also the
assessment thereof.
With such further investigations into this topic, a greater
understanding may be gained regarding the ways in which
behavior could be motivated implicitly to result in more
positive outcomes. That is, important activities for which
people lack sufficient motivation (e.g., dieting) may be
more likely to be selected and pursued if these activities
(or, at least, components of these activities) are made
predictive of motive-congruent incentives. Finally, as
congruence between motives and behavior has been asso-
ciated with greater well-being (Pueschel, Schulte, &
Michalak, 2011; Schu¨ler, Job, Fro¨hlich, & Brandsta¨tter,
2008), we hope that our studies will ultimately help pro-
vide a better understanding of how people’s health and
happiness might be more effectively promoted by
568 Psychological Research (2017) 81:560–570
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motivating individuals to selecting the actions that increase
their well-being.
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